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The Mortgage Interest Deduction (MID) has been under hot debate 
since before the Tax Reform Act of 1986. This paper reviews the 
MID debate, focusing on its efficiency in promoting homeownership 
and its redistributional effects. I examine whether or not the MID 
promotes homeownership, reveal why it is often believed to fail 
to achieve its intended incidence, discuss which groups of people 
benefit from it, and present the most referred proposals to replace 
it. Based on this analysis, I advocate that the MID be reformed and 
call for a wider public recognition of the issues surrounding it.
The Mortgage 
Interest Deduction
Debates and Possible Reforms
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has been under debate since the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986 when most other personal interest 
deductions were phased out. Given this context, 
the purpose of this paper is to examine the MID 
debate, to judge the opinions of both sides, and 
to provide some recommendations.
This paper is divided into three sections. The 
first section briefly introduces the MID and 
provides a brief overview of the debate. The 
second section offers a close examination of 
the major critiques of the MID, centering on its 
relationship to homeownership—that it does 
not promote homeownership, is regressive, and 
introduces a price capitalization effect. Both 
sides of the debate are synthesized to provide 
an informed argument about the MID and to 
shed light on the major concerns that alternative 
policies should address. The third section 
reviews some proposed alternatives to the MID. 
This paper concludes that the MID is a poorly 
designed policy and we should replace it with a 
mortgage interest credit.
A Brief Introduction of the MID and 
its Debate
The Mortgage Interest Deduction
The MID allows taxpayers who purchase their 
homes to reduce their annual taxable income 
by the amount of interest paid on their home 
loan each year. Although it was not originally 
designed to promote homeownership, it is 
generally regarded as a tax policy that achieves 
this goal (Carliner, 1998). However, according 
to the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, taxpayers 
must meet several conditions to qualify for the 
MID. First, they must itemize deductions rather 
than choose the standard deduction. Second, 
the deduction is limited to interest on debts 
secured by a principal residence or a second 
home. Third, interest is deductible on only the 
first $1 million of debt incurred to buy, build, or 
improve a home, or on other debt secured by a 
home, which can be used for any purpose but 
only to the extent that total home equity debt 
is $1 million or less. For qualified taxpayers, 
the value of the mortgage interest deduction 
is equal to the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate 
multiplied by the amount of mortgage interest 
paid that is in excess of the standard deduction 
(Morrow, 2012). For example, in 2013, married 
couples who jointly filed taxes received a $12,200 
standard deduction. If a married couple with a 
marginal tax rate of 15 percent pays $12,300 in 
mortgage interest in 2013, the MID will save the 
couple $15, 15 percent of the difference between 
the mortgage interest paid and the standard 
deduction.
I n “The American metropolis at century’s end: Past and future influences,” Robert Fishman (2000) ranks “Federal Housing Administration 
(FHA) mortgage financing and subdivision 
regulation” second among the top ten influences 
on the American metropolis in the past 50 years. 
Planners commonly cite Fishman’s opinion 
that FHA mortgage financing and regulations, 
along with subdivision regulation, are largely 
responsible for increasing the American 
homeownership rate, suburbanization, and 
racial segregation between 1945 and 1965 
(Fishman, 2000). While most planners have a 
general knowledge of FHA financing policies 
and regulations, important policies such as the 
Mortgage Interest Deduction (MID) are not 
as well understood. The MID is a tax policy; 
planners focus more on housing policies that 
directly relate to community development and 
housing opportunities, such as the Home Choice 
Voucher program and Low Income Housing 
Tax Credit (LIHTC) program. Nevertheless, 
understanding the MID and its challenges is 
helpful and even necessary to achieve planning 
goals. 
Through the lens of planning, this paper 
discusses the problems with and possible 
reforms of the MID’s current structure. In many 
cases, narrowly focusing on certain policies and 
subtly fine-tuning them without a structural 
change to the general policy framework makes 
little difference. For example, most planners 
advocate for the Voucher projects and LIHTC 
projects, yet they often find that, because 
of funding shortages, the results are merely 
adequate, despite many efforts to refine these 
projects. After all, federal funding is a zero-
sum game: funding some programs is done at 
the expense of funding others. Therefore, to 
better promote effective housing opportunities, 
planners should not only study these programs 
but also evaluate their funding competitors, 
among which the MID is the most expensive 
and contentious. 
The MID is the third-largest federal tax 
expenditure. Although it is charged with 
promoting homeownership, critics frequently 
claim it does not accomplish this goal. The MID 
has cost more than $70 billion annually during 
the past five years, and in 2013, a time of budget 
crisis in the United States, it cost approximately 
$100 billion. In comparison, the Voucher and 
LIHTC programs, two programs that effectively 
promote affordable housing, have budgets that 
combined never exceed $30 billion per year. If 
a costly policy like the MID is not effective in 
achieving its intended goals, we must reevaluate 
and reform or eliminate it. In fact, the MID 
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it would mainly impact younger, upper-
middle-income households. As for the charge 
that the MID results in overinvestment in 
owner-occupied housing, defenders argue that 
it is actually the untaxed imputed rent rather 
than the MID that distorts the market (Follain 
& Melamed, 1998; Gervais & Pandey, 2008; 
Woodward & Weicher, 1989). Finally, proponents 
of the policy argue that eliminating or reducing 
it would cause home prices to fall and unfairly 
hurt existing homeowners, which is especially 
undesirable in a depressed housing market. 
Both opponents and proponents of the MID 
raise many valid arguments. However, the 
proponents’ arguments that the opponents’ 
studies are imprecise and that the risks of 
eliminating the program are too high do not 
justify the continuation of the current policy, 
especially considering that a better alternative 
could achieve the stated benefits of the MID 
with greater efficiency. Many empirical studies 
have shown that the MID is ineffective at 
promoting homeownership and at providing 
households with the means to successfully 
transition from the rental market to the owner 
market. These households are considered part 
of the homeownership margin; in theory, they 
are the target market for MID policy. Many 
alternative policies have been proposed to 
reform this problematic tax policy. Such a 
reform requires extensive public support, but, 
unfortunately, a 2011 New York Times poll shows 
that about 90 percent of Americans support the 
MID, indicating a lack of public recognition of its 
problems (McCabe, 2011). The following sections 
provide a more detailed discussion of critiques 
of the MID and proposals to reform it in order 
to promote a better understanding and to garner 
more public support towards its reform. 
Critiques of the MID
The MID Does Not Promote Homeownership
Although the MID is the largest source 
of federal assistance to housing and the 
most important federal policy charged with 
promoting homeownership, studies provide 
almost no direct evidence to justify the extent 
to which it raises the homeownership rate—if 
it raises it at all. Some studies have shown 
that the tax system’s favorable treatment of 
owner-occupied housing raises the rate of 
homeownership (Hendershott & Shilling, 1980; 
Rosen & Rosen, 1980). For example, Rosen 
& Rosen (1980) estimate that tax subsidies 
for owner-occupied housing, including the 
MID, raised the homeownership rate by about 
four percent in 1974 and that these subsidies 
The Mortgage Interest Deduction Debate
As mentioned above, the MID has been under 
debate for decades. Many critics argue that 
the bulk of its benefits go to high-income 
households who could afford a home without 
assistance, while nearly half of middle- and low-
income homeowners1 with a mortgage receive 
no benefit at all (Glaeser & Shapiro, 2002; Landis 
& McClure, 2010; Morrow, 2012; Prante, 2006). 
Because of its regressive nature, this extremely 
costly tax expenditure has no significant impact 
on homeownership (Morrow, 2012; Toder, 
Austin, Lim & Getsinger, 2010). Moreover, the 
MID is criticized for resulting in overinvestment 
in owner-occupied housing at the expense of 
other business investment, as the government 
subsidy distorts capital prices in the market 
(Morrow, 2012). Finally, some critics argue that 
the MID contributes to the foreclosure crisis 
by encouraging borrowing against equity while 
contributing to suburbanization and the plight 
of the inner cities, as most housing subsidized 
Fig. 7.1: The MID Benefits Received 
by Households of Different income 
Levels 
Source: Internal Revenue Service, 
Tax Foundation calculations.
by the MID is in the suburbs (Voith, 2001). They 
argue that this results in additional negative 
redistributional effects. 
While opponents of the MID strive to prove 
that it is an ineffective tax policy that we 
should reform or eliminate, the policy also has 
many proponents. Supporters argue that the 
MID makes homeownership more affordable, 
especially for young middle- and high-income 
families since the proportion of interest is 
highest in the early years of a mortgage. They 
argue that eliminating the MID would increase 
the average age for first-time homeowners. 
Some proponents also argue that most critics 
overstate both the cost and redistributional 
effects of the MID (Follain & Melamed, 1998; 
Gervais & Pandey, 2008; Woodward & Weicher, 
1989). Taking into account behavioral changes, 
especially wealthy households reshuffling 
their portfolios, these studies find that the 
redistributional effects of the MID are much 
less regressive than they seem, and eliminating 
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The critical reason the MID fails to promote 
homeownership is that people on the 
homeownership margin rarely use the MID; 
the bulk of the tax money goes to high-income 
households whose tenure choices are barely 
affected by the tax policy (Fischer & Huang, 
2013; Glaeser & Shapiro, 2002; Landis & 
McClure, 2010). As mentioned above, the MID 
is only available to taxpayers who itemize their 
deductions and, for qualified taxpayers, its value 
is closely related to their marginal tax rate. Most 
low- and middle-income households use the 
standard deduction because it usually exceeds 
or approximates their itemized deduction, 
whereas high-income householders tend to 
itemize because it benefits them. Even if low- 
and middle-income households itemize their 
taxes, the received benefits are often negligible 
compared to those of high-income households. 
Therefore, the bulk of the benefits go to the 
pockets of higher-income households who do 
not need subsidies. Conversely, households who 
struggle through the homeownership margin 
and desperately need help receive little of the 
assistance.
The MID is Regressive
The above analysis reveals that the MID is 
ineffective in promoting homeownership. 
Many critics also raise the issue of equity—they 
point out that available data show that the 
MID is far too regressive (Fischer & Huang, 
2013; Prante, 2006; Rosen, 1985). Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) data from 2003 show 
that few low- and middle-income taxpayers 
benefited from the MID, while those earning 
over $75,000 in adjusted gross income (AGI) 
claimed the vast majority of deductions2 (see 
Table 1). According to a more recent study, 
homeowners with incomes above $100,000 
received 77 percent of the more than $70 billion 
tax expenditures on the MID in 2012, while 
homeowners with incomes below $50,000, who 
face severe housing cost burdens, received only 
three percent of the benefits (Fisher & Huang, 
2013). This study also reveals that nearly half 
of the homeowners who pay mortgage interest 
received no benefits from the MID, and only 
about 30 percent of eligible taxpayers actually 
used it. 
Prante (2006) believes that four key factors make 
the MID more valuable for high-income earners 
than low-income earners. First, as discussed 
above, taxpayers must itemize to claim the 
MID, but low-income taxpayers are less likely 
to itemize. Also, as itemized deductions are 
proportionate to the taxpayers’ tax bracket, the 
value of itemized deductions rises as income 
contributed to about one-quarter of the growth 
in homeownership since 1945. These empirical 
studies are considered by some proponents of 
the MID as indirect evidence that it promotes 
homeownership, but other experts argue that, 
rather than the MID, the critical ingredient of 
the homeownership subsidy is the omission of 
imputed rental income from taxable income 
(Follain, Ling, & McGill, 1993; Poterba & Sinai, 
2008). The estimates of both Follain, Ling, & 
McGill (1993) and Poterba & Sinai (2008) show 
that taxing the implicit rental income would 
lead to substantially higher tax burdens for 
homeowners than eliminating the mortgage 
Fig. 7.2: Breakdown of Tax 
Expenditures on MID in 2012.
source: Fisher and Huang, 2013
“The MID costs about $100 
billion in 2013 and ranks as 
the 3rd largest federal tax 
expenditure...” 
interest and property interest deduction. 
These empirical studies suggest that, although 
subsidies of owner-occupied housing increase 
the homeownership rate, it is more a result of 
the untaxed imputed rental income than the 
MID. 
In fact, most scholars believe that the MID is not 
a pro-homeownership policy in any meaningful 
sense (Glaeser & Shapiro, 2002; Hanson, 2012; 
Landis & McClure, 2010; Morrow, 2012). Using 
time series data from 1965 to 2000 to examine 
the relationship between homeownership rate, 
inflation rate, and the degree of itemization, 
Glaeser & Shapiro (2002) show that there was 
essentially no relationship between the subsidy 
rate and the level of homeownership. Hansen 
(2012), who examines how the MID affected 
housing purchases, finds that it was responsible 
for a 10.9 to 18.4 percent increase in the size of 
home purchased, but did not find a relationship 
between the MID and homeownership. By 
summarizing many empirical studies, Morrow 
(2012) concludes that international, interstate, 
and time-based comparisons of homeownership 
data and economic projections based on these 
data overwhelmingly suggest the MID does 
little to promote homeownership. Some results 
even show that the MID may discourage 
homeownership (Glaeser & Shapiro, 2002). 
Ironically, Glaeser & Shapiro (2002) find that 
states with bigger subsidies tend to have slightly 
lower homeownership rates than those with 
smaller subsidies. 
Percentage to 
Income over $100k
Percentage to 
Income under $50k
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value caused by a subsidy or incentive. This 
undermines the effectiveness of the MID 
because it capitalizes the increased value of 
housing into its price. Higher home prices could 
offset the increased demand to own homes 
resulting from the MID, or even discourage 
housing demand by making homeownership 
more difficult for less well-off households 
that receive little or no benefit from the 
MID. Because those on the margin of tenure 
choice receive little help from the MID, price 
capitalization may cause the MID to negatively 
influence homeownership rates. 
The extent to which the MID increases home 
prices depends on the elasticity of housing 
supply; the effect of the MID on housing 
prices varies across and within regions due to 
differences in local housing prices, loan-to-value 
ratio, local income and property taxes, and the 
availability of new housing supply (Bourassa 
& Yin, 2008; Capozza, Green, & Hendershott, 
1996; Hilber & Turner, 2013). While maintaining 
the stock of prime residential land inelastic, 
Capozza et al. (1996) estimate that eliminating 
the MID and property tax deduction4 
simultaneously would reduce housing prices 
by two to 13 percent in 63 metropolitan areas. 
Bourassa and Yin (2007) estimate that, due to 
effects on housing prices, the MID and property 
tax deductions reduced the homeownership 
rate of urban adults between 25 and 34 years 
old. Hilber and Turner (2013) find that the MID 
had both positive and negative impacts on 
individual homeownership decisions, depending 
on the restrictiveness of land use regulations at 
the place of residence and the income status of 
the household: the MID had a positive effect on 
homeownership attainment for higher income 
groups in places with elastic housing supply, 
no impact on low-income households, and a 
negative impact on homeownership attainment 
in restrictive urban places. 
Price capitalization also demonstrates that it 
is better to reform or replace the MID with 
other alternatives than to simply eliminate it. 
While price capitalization certainly weakens 
the arguments for the MID, its elimination is 
risky, as it could result in a decline in home 
values and the potential crash of the housing 
market (Morrow, 2012). Some defenders use this 
reason to claim that existing homeowners would 
suffer from eliminating it, which is particularly 
important consideration since the U.S. housing 
market is still gradually recovering from the 
sub-prime crisis (NPR Diane Rehm Show, 2012). 
Conversely, opponents of the current policy 
believe that the current recovery makes this 
precisely the right time to replace it with other, 
rises. Second, high-income taxpayers are more 
likely than low-income taxpayers to own homes. 
Third, high-income homeowners tend to buy 
more valuable homes and thus have to pay more 
mortgage interest. Finally, speculators tend to 
earn high incomes and have a higher loan-
to-value ratio3 than low- and middle-income 
households.
Whereas opponents of the MID cite these 
data to illustrate its regressivity, proponents 
believe its cost and redistributional effects are 
greatly overstated (Follain & Melamed, 1998; 
Gervais & Pandey, 2008). For example, Follain 
and Melamed (1998) estimate that the revenue 
gain from eliminating the MID in 1997 was 
roughly $10 billion, rather than the $40 to $50 
billion estimated by the Joint Committee on 
Taxation and the Congressional Budget Office. 
Elimination of the MID will not likely affect 
households with the highest incomes that are 
considered to receive the largest amount its 
benefits, because such households can reshuffle 
their portfolios (Follain & Melamed, 1998). 
Proponents also argue that the MID levels the 
playing field between equity and debt, and 
thus potentially benefits the poor and young 
homebuyers who rely on debt to purchase 
houses (Gervais & Pandey, 2008; Woodward & 
Weicher, 1989). Woodward and Weicher (1989) 
promote this argument, claiming the MID 
accommodates the smoothing of income over 
time, correcting the tilt of the real payment 
burden of the mortgage in the beginning of 
the loan. While these results provide some 
support for the current MID policy, they do 
not refute its regressive nature. Even if the cost 
and redistributional impact of the MID are 
overstated, these arguments do not justify its 
continuation. 
The MID Results in Price Capitalization
Another critique of the MID is that it leads 
to price capitalization, which is the increase 
in the price of an asset due to its increased 
Fig. 7.3: Comparison of Mortgage 
Interest Credit Proposals 
Source: Fischer and Huang, 2013
Proposal Limit on Interest 
Covered
Credit % Credit for 
2nd Homes
Type of Credit
Bush Tax Reform 
Panel
Interest on mortgages up 
to 125% of median price 
in area
15 No Non-Refundable 
Owner-Claimed
Rivline-Domenici 
Commission
$25,000 15 No Lended-Claimed
Bowles-Simpson 
Illustrative Plan
Interest on mortgage up to 
$500,000
12 No Non-Refundable 
Owner-Claimed
Ellison Bill Interest on mortgages up 
to $500,000
15 Yes Non-Refundable 
Owner-Claimed
Viard Paper Inerest on mortgages up to 
$300,000
15 No Refundable
Owner-Claimed
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1999). Green and Vandell (1999) estimate that 
the overall homeownership rate could increase 
by three percent if the government replaced the 
mortgage interest and property tax deductions 
with a revenue-neutral credit of $1,173 for all 
homeowners. They argue that this new policy 
would significantly help households with an 
annual income of less than $40,000. Carasso 
et al. (2005) propose replacing the MID with a 
revenue-neutral, fully refundable credit equal 
to 1.03 percent of the first $100,000 of a home’s 
value. Following such a policy, they estimate 
that nearly 50 percent of tax units would see 
a tax cut. Gruber and Stephens-Davidowitz 
(2007) argue that a targeted tax credit—that 
is, a refundable first-time homebuyers credit 
equal to $6,000 for married couples and $3,000 
for others —would more efficiently promote 
homeownership. These solutions would 
all create a more progressive system, thus 
addressing a major problem with the current 
MID.
Two recent studies have evaluated and 
compared the effects of replacing the MID with 
mortgage interest credits (Fischer & Huang, 2013; 
Toder, Austin, Lim, & Getsinger, 2010). Toder, 
Austin, Lim & Getsinger (2010) use the Tax Policy 
Center micro-simulation model to estimate 
the effects of eliminating the MID, replacing it 
with four options that have approximately the 
same cost: a 20 percent, non-refundable interest 
credit; a 17 percent refundable interest credit; a 
non-refundable, 100 percent credit on the first 
$2,030 of mortgage interest; and a refundable, 
100 percent credit on the first $1,490 of mortgage 
interest. Although these four options would have 
different consequences, they are all potentially 
more effective in promoting homeownership 
and have more even distributional effects. 
In other words, they would all make the tax 
code more progressive (Toder, Austin, Lim 
& Getsinger, 2010). Fischer and Huang (2013) 
compare five influential proposals to reform the 
MID, including the proposals from the Bush Tax 
Reform Panel, the Rivlin-Domenici Commission, 
the Bowles-Simpson Illustrative Plan, the Ellison 
Bill, and the Viard Paper (see Table 2). They 
concluded that “converting the deduction to a 
well-designed credit would be more effective 
in promoting homeownership while generating 
substantial revenues and making the tax code 
fairer” (Fisher & Huang, 2013, p. 6). Both of these 
studies have pointed out the great advantages of 
mortgage interest credits over the MID. While it 
is difficult to judge which of these alternatives 
is most well-designed and certainly all of them 
call for public deliberation, they provide some 
options for MID reform. 
more effective policies to incentivize low- and 
middle-income households to become first-
time homebuyers and to serve as the potential 
solution to the recent foreclosure crisis. 
Other Critiques of the MID
This paper focuses on the relationship between 
the MID and homeownership, but there are 
a number of other critiques. Because they are 
tangential to my main argument, I will not go 
into detail, but they are worth noting. Among 
these, the most commonly mentioned is that the 
MID skews the allocation of capital across the 
economy by lowering taxes on owner-occupied 
housing investment relative to other business 
investments (Gale, Gruber & Stephens, 2007; 
Morrow, 2012). Also, Morrow (2012) argues 
that the MID encourages risky behaviors by 
incentivizing highly leveraged purchases, 
which led many homeowners to have high 
loan-to-value ratios and thus contributed to 
the foreclosure crisis. Moreover, the MID—
usually paid out over  30 years—is insensitive 
to market conditions: it continues to subsidize 
home purchases when the market is already 
functioning effectively but then fails to provide 
timely incentives during depressed housing 
market conditions (Morrow, 2012). In addition, 
some critics accuse the MID of magnifying 
the impact of economic forces that lead to 
decentralization, disproportionally favoring 
homeownership in the suburbs, contributing to 
high concentrations of poverty in central cities, 
and thus discouraging the homeownership rate 
in these locations (Voith, 1999). 
Proposals to Reform the MID
The MID is problematic because it requires 
taxpayers to itemize deductions and its benefits 
increase with taxpayers’ marginal tax rate, which 
results in its regressive distributional effects. 
These challenges contribute to the policy’s 
ineffectiveness in promoting homeownership by 
limiting access and providing unequal benefits. 
Therefore, the simplest way to reform the MID 
is to replace it with a tax credit that applies to 
every household. Indeed, many researchers 
believe that a mortgage interest credit better 
targeted at families in need would have a 
modest influence on the housing market and 
is likely to cost less than the MID (Fischer and 
Huang, 2013; Morrow, 2012; Toder, Austin, Lim 
& Getsigner, 2010). 
Since the beginning of the MID debate, many 
alternative tax credit policies have been 
suggested (Carasso, 2005; Gale, Gruber, & 
Stephens-Davidowitz, 2007; Green & Vandell, 
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Replacing the MID with a mortgage interest 
credit could give this tax policy better 
vertical equity; however, those who propose 
to completely eliminate it raise the issue of 
horizontal equity.5 Owner-occupants’ imputed 
rental income is not taxed in the United States, 
which lowers the after-tax cost of owner-
occupied housing capital compared to that of 
the rental market. In fact, many find that the 
real tax subsidy to homeownership is not the 
MID or property tax deduction, but the untaxed 
imputed rental income (Aaron, 1972; Follain, 
Ling and McGill, 1993). If renters and owners 
are treated fairly to achieve horizontal equity, 
then owner-occupants’ imputed rental income 
should be taxed, or mortgage interest and 
property tax deductions should be eliminated 
(Green & Malpezzi, 2003). The increased 
burden to existing homeowners makes both 
choices politically contentious and extremely 
difficult to implement. Therefore, even though 
many people recognize the horizontal inequity 
between owners and renters, most tend to focus 
on the issue of vertical inequity. Moreover, 
the universal social norm seems to support 
homeownership, which means a certain amount 
Notes
1. Using 2012 as the reference year, I define low-income 
households as those whose annual household income is less 
than $50,000 (about the American median household income 
in 2012), middle-income households as those whose annual 
household income is between $50,001 and $100,000, and 
high-income households as those whose annual household 
income is more than $100,000.
2. The table shows the household income in 2003, when the 
median household income was $42,560; therefore households 
with an income above $75,000 could roughly be considered as 
high-income households.
3. Loan-to-value ratio is the ratio of a loan to the value of 
an asset purchased. In general, high-income families have 
a higher loan-to-value ratio than low- and middle-income 
families for two main reasons. The first is that they have a 
of homeownership subsidy is appropriate. 
The issue of horizontal inequity is negligible 
if everyone intends to become a homeowner 
eventually. 
Conclusion
While the Tax Reform Act of 1986 phased out 
many forms of personal interest deduction, 
the MID was retained as a means to promote 
homeownership and to preserve the part of 
the American Dream that homeownership 
symbolizes (Carliner, 1998). However, extensive 
studies have shown that the MID is a poorly 
designed policy that fails to achieve its intended 
incidence because rich homeowners receive the 
bulk of its benefits, while those on the margin of 
homeownership barely benefit from it. If people 
still consider the MID as useful for raising the 
homeownership rate, it is time to reconsider 
this ineffective yet costly tax policy and 
reform it. Replacing the MID with a mortgage 
interest credit is likely to have more progressive 
redistributional effects, promote homeownership 
more effectively, and potentially reduce federal 
costs and lessen the federal fiscal crisis. 
better chance of borrowing money. The second is that they 
tend to borrow more to put their own equity into high-yield 
investments. 
4. The property tax deduction, like the MID, is also an 
itemized deduction that allows homeowners to reduce their 
annual taxable income by the state and local property taxes 
paid. Together with the MID, these two deductions are the 
most common tax deductions for homeowners and thus are 
often discussed together. 
5. Vertical equity implies that people with higher incomes 
should pay more in taxes, and tax revenues should be 
distributed in a progressive way. Horizontal equity implies that 
people at an identical income level should be treated equally 
(be taxed equally and receive the same amount of benefits). 
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